NEAR HACKATHON · 2026
NEAR testnet

Bound

A surety bond for AI agents on NEAR. Know an agent's worst case before you deal with it, with a number anyone can read in one view call.

01 / 10
The problem

An agent with a key
is an unpriced risk

Services are asked to sell to agents, and to extend them credit, on “trust me, my agent is safe.” Nobody can check that sentence, size it, or recover against it.

A prompt-injected agent spends whatever its key allows, and when harm happens there is no money set aside and no rule for who is paid first.

02 / 10
The solution

One certificate, three numbers you can check

Reserve
Pre-funded by the operator and locked in the contract. Arbitrated victims are paid from it first.
Slashable stake
An auditor locks its own capital behind the certificate and is slashed for what the reserve could not cover.
Spend meter
Every payment is limited by the float and metered in spent, and goes only to allowlisted recipients when the operator sets an allowlist.

Coverage = reserve + auditor stake. The bound is a meter, not a guarantee.

03 / 10
How it works

Publish, confine, pay, claim, settle

WhoDoes
Operatorpublishes the certificate (bound, reserve, float cap, allowlist, expiry) and funds it
Agentaccepts once, then keeps only a function-call key that can call pay
Auditorattests by locking stake, earns the premium (less a 10% protocol fee)
Victimfiles a harm claim, which opens a claim window and freezes payments; the arbiter rules; when the window ends anyone closes it

Settlement waterfall, run mwfnc6q8: 120 = 100 reserve + 20 slash. The auditor's other 180 was not touched.

04 / 10
Why NEAR

The account model does half the enforcement

Function-call access key
The agent's only key is scoped to the Bound contract and the single method pay, gas-only allowance.
Named accounts
Certificates and allowlists name readable accounts, not key hashes.
View calls
verify, get_cert and the access-key list are free reads anyone can make. No wallet, no indexer.
No code on the agent
No contract and no global contract on the agent account: nothing on it can route around the meter.
05 / 10
Demo and proof
Run mwfnc6q8

Recorded, then re-checked against the chain

ClaimResult
Recorded transactions, each re-checked on an archival node by the run page37 / 37
Assertions on balances, statuses and keys36 pass
Hijacked-key attempts: overspend, off-allowlist, ft_transfer, mint, withdraw, send NEARall refused
False fraud claim rejected in the same transaction, bond forfeitedrejected
Contract code hash against the wasm built from the tagged commitmatches
06 / 10
Developer surface

Ask the same question from anywhere

SDK
npm install @bound/near
a typed client for the contract
CLI
verify <agent>
the deal-or-refuse answer from a terminal
MCP server
near_verify_agent · near_get_certificate · near_check_agent_keys · near_pay
HTTP
GET /api/near/verify/<agent>
for a service gate
07 / 10
What was built in the window

From zero to a settled claim on testnet

WhatState
Bound contract in Rust on near-sdk, with an open-mint test tokenbound-v3 live
Two rounds of review fixes, each redeployed; earlier versions kept and labelled supersededv1 · v2 · v3
@bound/near: client, CLI, MCP server; plus a 402-style demo service gate in the repopackage
End-to-end demo, eight acts, committed as evidence4 runs
This site: verify, certificates, run pages, docsread-only
08 / 10
The honest slide

Trust model and limits

A claim we could have madeWhat is actually true
It moves real moneytestnet only, with an open-mint test token
Claims are decided trustlesslyarithmetic proofs are; a harm claim is decided by one arbiter account, held by the author
The contract is immutableits deployer key is still on it; the code-hash check is how you see it has not changed
An independent auditorthe demo auditor and treasury are ours, and disclosed
09 / 10
What comes next
Roadmap

Mainnet, a DAO arbiter,
Intents funding

Deploy to mainnet with the deployer key removed. Hand the arbiter role to a Sputnik DAO. Let operators fund reserves through NEAR Intents. The ask: a first service willing to gate its agents on a certificate.

10 / 10