bound-agent-mwfnc6q8.testnet
A counterparty should refuse: certificate status is invalid. Read at block time 2026-11-14T11:43:54Z. Created by demo run mwfnc6q8.
What stands behind it
- Still held (not active coverage)
- 180 mUSDC
- Bound (spend meter, not a guarantee)
- 150 mUSDC
- Reserve locked / promised
- 0 / 100 mUSDC
- Auditor stake allocated
- 180 mUSDC
- Premium paid at attest
- 0 mUSDC
- Expires
- 2026-11-14T01:08:33Z (past)
Coverage is the most that arbiter-upheld victims of this certificate recover together: first from the operator's reserve, then from the auditor's slashed stake for what the reserve could not cover. Every service extending credit to this agent shares it. The arbiter is the Bound team's own account on testnet.
Spend meter
- Spent through pay
- 5 mUSDC in 1 payment
- Float left / cap
- 0 / 20 mUSDC
- Spent after expiry
- 0 mUSDC
- Recipient allowlist
- bound-service-mwfnc6q8.testnet
- Operator halt
- halted
Spend is gross flow to counterparties, not loss.
The agent's keys (confinement proof)
Confined: its only key is a function-call key for bound-v3.boundproto-nh26.testnet, method pay, no full-access key, no contract code and no global contract.
- ed25519:DXrKKrRc6vMv5FEZ6Ln2fKuTsMMpBE1wPpp8PiRKmzdRFunctionCall · receiver bound-v3.boundproto-nh26.testnet · methods [pay] · gas allowance 0.248 NEAR
- Contract code on the account (view_account.code_hash): 11111111111111111111111111111111 (none)
- Global contract (view_account.global_contract_hash / global_contract_account_id): none
A function-call key cannot attach a deposit and cannot reach any other contract, so NEAR itself (not this contract, not an SDK) refuses an ft_transfer, a withdraw or a plain NEAR transfer signed with it. Check it yourself: near account list-keys bound-agent-mwfnc6q8.testnet network-config testnet nowKeys are only half of it: code deployed on the agent account, or a global contract it uses, would run as the agent with no key, so the account must also have no contract code (code_hash of all ones) and no global contract (a global-contract account also shows code_hash of all ones, so both global_contract fields must be empty). The Bound contract cannot see any of this, which is why this page reads it.
Claims and the claim window
Window closed and settled.
- #0 Bound exceeded (trustless)Rejected
by bound-challenger-mwfnc6q8.testnet for victim bound-challenger-mwfnc6q8.testnet · bond 10 · filed 2026-11-14T00:09:20Z · arbiter: not proven, harm 0
The bond went to the treasury in the same transaction.
- #1 Harm claim of 120 (arbiter-assessed)Upheld
by bound-service-mwfnc6q8.testnet for victim bound-service-mwfnc6q8.testnet · bond 10 · filed 2026-11-14T00:09:25Z · arbiter: proven, harm 120 · evidence near/evidence/gate-mwfnc6q8-invoices.json#inv-1
Settlement (fraud)
Settled 2026-11-14T00:11:00Z with 1 admitted claim, in one transaction. Certificate is now Invalid.
- Payablemin(total harm, reserve + allocation)
- 120 mUSDC
- Drawn from reservemin(payable, reserve)
- 100 mUSDC
- Paid to victimsreserve draw plus slash top-up, pro rata
- 120 mUSDC
- Challenger fees10% of harm from what is left of the reserve
- 0 mUSDC
- Auditor slashedonly the part the reserve could not cover
- 20 mUSDC
- Slash paid to victimsunpaid arbitrated harm first
- 20 mUSDC
- To treasuryleftover slash and undistributed draw
- 0 mUSDC
- Unslashed allocation (released at deadline)allocation minus slash
- 180 mUSDC
- Hygiene bountytrustless hygiene claims only
- 0 mUSDC
Participants
- OperatorBound balance 1,181 · wallet 0 mUSDC
- bound-operator-mwfnc6q8.testnet
- AgentBound balance 0 · wallet 0 mUSDC
- bound-agent-mwfnc6q8.testnet
- AuditorBound balance 3.6 · wallet 0 mUSDC
- bound-auditor-mwfnc6q8.testnet
- Contract
- bound-v3.boundproto-nh26.testnet